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Abstract 
  
Despite the huge audit pricing literature, there is a dearth of evidence on the temporal dynamics of audit 
fee adjustments and the persistence of audit fees. Based on a sample of 76,867 panel observations for a 
sample of UK companies audited by the Big 4 over the period 1998 to 2012, we employ consistent lagged 
dependent variable panel estimators to provide new evidence on the persistence and dynamics of real Big 
4 audit fees. Contrary to extant research, which assumes that audit fees adjust immediately in a single 
period, our empirical results indicate that Big 4 real audit fees are persistent, being partly dependent on 
their previous realisations. We conclude that static audit fee models omit a potentially important temporal 
dimension of audit pricing behaviour and that further research is warranted into dynamic audit fee models  
across other jurisdictions. 
Keywords: real audit fees, Big 4, partial adjustment, persistence, adjustment speed, dynamic panel 
estimates, listed and unlisted companies 
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                                                               1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Despite the huge audit pricing literature, few studies have examined whether lagged audit fees contribute 
to an explanation of current audit fees given other exogenous determinants. None, to our knowledge, have 
modelled the influence of lagged real audit fees on current real audit fees. Implicitly, standard audit fee 
models assume that audit fees are unrelated to fees charged in previous periods and adjust fully to their 
determinants in a single period.  
We provide novel empirical evidence on the dynamics and persistence of Big 4 real audit fees for 
UK companies. We report dynamic panel estimates for both the listed and unlisted firms, which exhibit 
high and low1 Big 4 concentration respectively. We focus on the Big 4 since they are of particular interest 
as the ‘oligopolistic’ suppliers of audit services in listed markets. In addition, and following Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) and Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who restrict their samples to Big 4/5 auditees2, we confine our 
estimation to Big 4 audits to reduce the effects of cross-sectional heterogeneity and to avoid increased 
model complexity3.   
Although there is a voluminous literature on audit fee determinants (e.g., Hay, Knechel and 
Wong, 2006; and Hay, 2013) relatively few studies use panel data methods4. In this context, De Villiers, 
Hay and Zhang (2014, p. 3) stress that ‘the cost behavior of audit fees, especially over time, is not well 
understood and the examination of audit fee behavior over time can improve our understanding of the 
                                                 
1
 Peel and Makepeace (2012), report that only 8.2% of the audits of a large sample of UK private companies were 
conducted by Big 4 auditors. 
2
 Note also that prior research (Chaney, Jeter and Shivakumar, 2004; and Clatworthy, Makepeace and Peel, 2009) 
suggests that separate models are appropriate for Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees, since regression-estimated slope 
coefficients differ significantly between the two groups. 
3
 As described in Section 2, for similar reasons, we also exclude from our sample companies that had switched 
auditors and/or company type. 
4
 Examples where standard (not dynamic) panel estimators are employed to examine audit fee determinants include 
the studies of Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) who use an OLS panel estimator; Evans and Schwartz (2014), who 
apply fixed effects panel methods; and Oxera (2006) who employ both fixed and random effects panel estimators. 
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audit market’. With a few exceptions5, extant studies ignore6 the potential dynamics of audit pricing by 
assuming that fees are not persistent given the other determinants 7. Importantly, if a lagged dependent 
variable is a significant8 determinant of the dependent variable, but is omitted from the estimated panel 
model, then it follows that if the remaining explanatory variables are correlated to some extent with the 
lagged dependent variable, they will be correlated with the model error term. In consequence, biased 
estimates of coefficients will be observed (Nickell, 1981).    
Access to unique data sources for the population of UK limited companies facilitated the 
collection of a comprehensive vector of explanatory variables and firm-level observations for a relatively 
long period. Our panel data comprises 76,867 Big 4 auditee observations over the period 1998 to 2012. 
Using consistent panel data estimation methods, which control for the inherent endogeneity associated 
with lagged dependent variables, our empirical results indicate that Big 4 real audit fees exhibit 
persistence (adjust dynamically) in both the listed and unlisted UK corporate markets. We conclude that 
static audit fee models omit a potentially important temporal dimension of audit pricing and that further 
research is warranted in other jurisdictions.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and estimation  
                                                 
5
 Four studies, prepared for/by regulatory authorities, employ the lagged value of audit fees in their models as an 
additional control variable, but do not address the dynamics of audit pricing (Oxera, 2006; OFT, 2011; PwC, 2012; 
and Deloitte, 2012). Xie, Cai and Ye (2010) estimate an audit fee model for Chinese listed companies with the aim 
of employing the residuals in a second step outcome model. They include lagged audit fees as a control variable, but 
estimate their model using standard OLS, which produces inconsistent (biased) estimates. Indirect evidence that 
audit fees might exhibit temporal dependency is provided by the research of Doogar, Sivadasan and Solomon 
(2015). They find that audit fee residuals exhibit persistence, in that the value of the residuals of an audit fee model 
estimated for the previous period are related to the audit fees charged in the current period. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that audit fees are serially correlated, providing motivation for employing dynamic panel 
methods. 
6
 In a recent paper, Klumpes, Komarev and Eleftheriou (2016) provide dynamic panel audit fee estimates for a 
sample of UK insurance companies, based on 175 firm-level observations over the period 1999–2009. However, the 
dependent variable is expressed as the ratio of audit fees to total assets. Hence, audit pricing dynamics (adjustments) 
cannot be established or interpreted in a conventional way - especially as size is the principal determinant of audit 
fees and does not exhibit a unit coefficient relationship in any study we are aware of. 
7
 Another recent paper includes the lagged dependent variable in an audit fee model. Abdallah, Goergen and 
O 'Sullivan (2015) examine whether cross-listed companies are charged a fee premium. They do so in the context of 
highlighting endogeneity issues/remedies in empirical management/business studies. They report that the log of 
nominal audit fees exhibits persistence, in that the coefficient of lagged audit fees is positive and statistically 
significant when employing appropriate estimators. 
8
 Of course, given its endogenous nature, this assumes that coefficient of the lagged dependent variable would have 
been significant when using consistent panel estimators. 
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method. Section 3 presents the results of the empirical study. Section 4 provides a number of potential 
explanations for our empirical finding that Big 4 real audit fees exhibit persistence. Section 5 contains our 
concluding comments.  
                                            2.  DATA AND ESTIMATION METHOD  
(i) Data and Variables 
Our data cover the population of UK companies and is obtained from two commercial credit reference 
databases which we had access to over a substantial period. Our initial sample comprises all independent 
(not held as subsidiary) non-financial companies audited by the Big 4, with data available over the period 
1997 to 2012. This creates an unbalanced panel of 64,635 UK companies, representing 340,878 firm-year 
observations. Of these, 1,723 (11,716 observations) are listed auditees, with the remainder comprising 
unlisted (private and public) limited companies.  
 To avoid modelling complexity in our investigation of Big 4 audit pricing dynamics, we exclude 
all companies which changed auditors or company type (e.g., private to listed), together with beginning-
period observations where we are unable to establish whether an auditee switched auditors/company 
type9. Following this screening, the sample decreases to 15,804 companies (88,681 observations), of 
which 267 (2,492 observations) are listed. This substantial reduction in the number of companies and 
observations (about 69% for both listed and unlisted companies) stems from the fact that if one or more of 
the three filters applies to a company at any point during the estimation period, then the company is 
removed from the sample. After deleting companies with incorrect/unusual variable values10, the sample 
reduces further to 15,582 companies (86,445 observations), of which 263 companies (2,435 observations) 
are listed. Finally, to facilitate instrumentation, companies are required to have a minimum of 3 panel 
observations, leading to a final sample of 76,867 observations for 10,345 companies over the period 1998 
                                                 
9
 Because the focus of this note is an investigation of whether Big 4 audit fees follow a dynamic process, the 
deletion of such companies ensures a homogeneous sample, free from additional modelling complexities (e.g., 
Reynolds and Francis, 2001, p. 381). 
10
 Companies are excluded if they meet one or more of the following criteria: ARTA, CATA or FORSAL outside 
the range of zero and unity (see Appendix for variable definitions), or pre-tax profit > sales. To avoid potential 
scanning errors, we also follow Clatworthy et al. (2009, p.148) and exclude companies with total assets or sales 
below £1,000 and/or with audit fees below £100. 
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to 2012, with the figures for listed companies being 2,336 and 227 respectively. 
The Appendix provides definitions, labels and summary statistics for the variables employed in 
the study. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real audit fees (LNFEE). With regard to the 
seminal research of Simunic (1980), and prior studies, our models include a comprehensive range of 
explanatory variables that focus on auditee size, complexity and risk. Unsurprisingly, corporate size has 
been found to be the principal determinant of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006, p. 169), though, usually, only 
one size (typically total assets) variable is used in empirical studies (Hay et al., 2006; and Hay, 2013).  
Given that company size is the principal driver of audit fees, we employ two size variables, the log of real 
total assets (LNTA) and the log of real sales (LNSAL). Importantly, in this context, Pong and Whittington 
(1994, p.1075) stress that audits have two broad dimensions, ‘an audit of transactions and verification of 
assets. The former will be related to turnover and the latter to total assets.’ 
To capture audit complexity, we use five standard control variables: the ratio of accounts 
receivable to total assets (ARTA), the ratio of current assets to total assets (CATA), the log of the number 
(plus 1) of subsidiaries (LNSUB), the ratio of foreign sales to total assets (FORSAL) and whether or not a 
company received an audit qualification (QUAL). We also include dummy variables for private (PRIV) 
and unlisted public limited (PLC) companies which we expect to exhibit negative coefficients, given that 
listed audits are more complex/risky. In line with previous research, we include standard control variables 
to proxy for audit risk11: the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), the ratio of net profit before tax 
to sales (PRSAL) and whether a company is loss-making (LOSS).  
We also include a variable (LATE), which denotes that a company filed its accounts after the 
statutory filing time deadline, thereby incurring penalties. Such companies are expected to be associated 
with more complex/risky audits (Evans and Schwartz, 2014). Two standard variables indicate whether a 
company’s year-end falls in December or March, referred to as the ‘busy’ audit period (BUSY), and  
whether a company is located in London (LOND) to account for the associated higher cost of living. We 
                                                 
11
 Following prior research, to mitigate the impact of outliers, TLTA and RETSAL are winsorized at their 1% and 
99% percentiles. We do not winsorize ARTA, CATA or FORSAL since they lie naturally between zero and one. 
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control for industry differentials (INDUSTRY) via 33 two-digit SIC dummy variables and also include 
time dummies (TIME) in our model specifications, together with auditor indicator variables, with PwC 
being the base case.    
Finally, since higher industry market share may be associated with higher fees, we follow Evans 
and Schwartz (2014) and compute the log of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (LNHHI), with reference 
to audit fees.  More specifically:  
             ܪܪܫ௜,� = ∑ (��ݎ��ݐ ݏℎ�ݎ�௜,�,௝ ∗ ͳͲͲ)ଶ�௝=ଵ                                                                                      (1) 
Where i is an industry sector, t is the panel year, j is an auditor and N is the number of auditors.12  
(ii) Estimation Method  
Due to correlated errors, it is well known that includingYit1 (the lagged dependent variable) in models 
estimated with standard panel methods (e.g., the studies of Oxera, 2006; and OFT, 2011) result in biased 
parameter estimates (Nickell, 1981). In this study we employ the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (ABBB) 
generalised method of moments (GMM) system estimator for unbalanced panels (see Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; and Blundell and Bond, 2000). Though the outcome model is estimated 
in levels, the ABBB GMM method jointly estimates an elegant system of equations where Y is specified 
in both differences and levels13.  
 As well as employing standard (X) instruments in the difference equation, we include lagged 
levels of Y as instruments, whereas for the levels equation, we include lagged first differences of Y as 
instruments14. Put simply, the system estimator combines the moment conditions in both levels and 
                                                 
12
 We employ 33 industrial sectors with reference to two-digit SIC codes and use all the available (11,745) auditors 
(Big 4 and non-Big 4) on our database to establish yearly audit fee market shares. Separate HHI calculations are 
made for the pooled (listed and unlisted company) sample, and for the sub-samples of listed and unlisted auditees. 
13
 An issue with GMM panel estimators is the proliferation of instruments, which increase in number  as a quartic of 
the available panel time periods (Roodman, 2009), leading to potential overfitting of endogenous lagged dependent 
variables, together with misleading  specification tests. In consequence, we use the method of collapsed instruments 
as described by Roodman (2009). This results in a smaller instrument matrix. It is implemented using Roodman’s 
(2009) xtabond2 Stata package. 
14
 Examples of the use of dynamic panel estimators in business finance research include the studies of 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008), Ozkan (2001), Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2007), Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano (2008) and Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2010), who examine the dynamics of bank profits, 
capital structure, executive remuneration, cash holdings and accounts payable respectively. 
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differences to provide efficient and consistent estimates of panel models that include lagged dependent 
variables15. 
We report two standard dynamic panel model specification tests in our empirical study. The 
Sargan (1958) over-identifying restrictions test, tests whether instruments are valid with regard to an 
absence of correlation between instruments and model errors. Statistically insignificant Sargan statistics 
are consistent with the instruments being appropriate. In a similar vein, we report tests of whether there is 
evidence of autocorrelation of model residuals (AR). Serially correlated residuals lead to biased parameter 
estimates. For GMM models which containYit1, the appropriate test is whether there is evidence of 
second order, AR(2), serial correlation (Arellano and Bover, 1995). As with the Sargan test, statistically 
insignificant AR(2) statistics are consistent with an absence of serially correlated errors. 
As shown in the Appendix, to account for inflation, and following McMeeking, Peasnell and 
Pope (2007) and Evans and Schwartz (2014), we express audit fees in real terms (constant 2012 prices). 
Similarly, the size variables included in our models (sales and total assets) are also computed in real 
terms, since auditors are expected to adjust real audit fees in response to real changes in auditee size 
(Evans and Schwartz, 2014). In this context, note that inflation effects disappear in the ratio of two 
nominal variables, assuming the same variable (deflator) is employed as the numerator for both ratios.  
However, this is not the case for panel data estimators where variables are in levels. More specifically, if 
we regressed the level of nominal audit fees on the lagged level of nominal audit fees, ceteris paribus, a 
significant relationship could be observed between the two nominal audit fee variables (even in the 
limiting case when real audit fees are constant)  if inflation is non-zero. We would simply be capturing 
 
                                                 
15
 As a precursor to estimation, we tested for unit root in the logarithm of audit fees employing Harris-Tzavalis tests 
(Harris and Tzavalis, 1999). We conducted tests on companies with the maximum of 15 time series observations; 
that is a balanced panel with 1,195 companies. The Harris-Tzavalis tests rejected the null of a unit root (at p < 0.01) 
when drift or trend were included and with/without cross-sectional demeaning (to reduce the impact of possible 
cross-sectional dependence). We also carried out the same tests on each of the continuous explanatory variables. 
Again, they rejected the null of a unit root in all series (at p < 0.01 in all cases). A priori, if audit fees are 
characterised by a unit root, perhaps the only candidate variable that would cointegrate with audit fees would be a 
non-stationary corporate size variable. However, as stated, for the current data, the statistical tests reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root in the size variables employed in the current study. 
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 the persistence in the level of the price index16.    
                                                       3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To illustrate how our models perform in a standard setting, and to facilitate comparison with extant/future 
studies, Table 1 reports standard (non-dynamic) fixed effects and OLS panel estimates17 of LNFEE. As 
shown in the table, we report models for the pooled (listed and unlisted auditee) sample, together with 
separate ones for listed and unlisted companies. The table shows that, in general, the primary control 
variables exhibit their expected signs and that, other than for the listed sample, are highly significant for 
the OLS specifications. When individual company-specific time invariant effects are controlled for with 
the fixed effects specifications, some variables lose statistical significance, with the model R2s also being 
smaller than those of the OLS models.                                             
                                                             Tables 1 to 3 about here 
Although models 3 and 4 for listed companies reveal that fewer variables are statistically 
significant than for their unlisted counterparts (models 4 and 5), or for the pooled specifications (models 1 
and 2), the R2s of the listed models are substantially higher in all cases18. Also noteworthy is that, for the 
OLS estimates, LNHHI is positively and significantly associated with LNFEE in both the listed and 
unlisted company samples. However, for the pooled sample, LNHHI exhibits a negative and significant 
coefficient in the fixed and random effects specifications (models 1 and 2). Importantly, and as expected, 
the coefficients of the corporate size variables (LNTA and LNSAL), are highly significant in all models. 
Table 2 presents similar OLS and fixed effects models to those shown in Table 1, but includes 
LNFEE(t-1) as an additional explanatory variable. We do this for two reasons. Firstly to illustrate the  
persistence of audit fees in a standard panel modelling framework; and secondly, to provide useful 
                                                 
16
 Note, however, that if the logarithms of nominal audit fees are employed, then the coefficients will be estimated 
correctly, but only if time dummies are included to allow the intercept to have a different value in each period.                                         
17
 For completeness, we also estimated random effects panel specifications. In terms of coefficients signs and 
significance levels, the results are broadly in line with the OLS panel estimates. As noted by a reviewer, random 
effects models require strong assumptions with regard to interpreting estimated parameters. 
18
 Chaney et al. (2004, p. 64) also report a relatively low adjusted R2 (0.57) for their audit fee model of UK private 
companies; whereas McMeeking, Peasnell and Pope (2006, p. 217) report a substantially higher R2 (0.82) for their 
model of UK listed companies. As shown in Table 1, these compare to R2 s of 0.62 (0.84) for the unlisted (listed) 
models in the current study.  
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coefficient bounds with which to gauge the dynamic panel coefficient estimates. As Table 2 reveals, in 
general, the same patterns of significant explanatory variables as those reported are in Table 1 are 
repeated, though with the addition of LNFEE(t-1), the model R2s are substantially higher than their 
counterparts in Table 1. For the pooled (unlisted) samples, the OLS LNFEE(t-1) coefficients of 0.849 
(0.851) indicate that real audit fees are highly persistent, with the coefficient (0.659) for the listed model 
being considerably lower, but still consistent with substantial persistence in audit fees. The same pattern 
is evident for the fixed effects models, but the coefficients of LNFEE(t-1) are much smaller. 
Although the OLS and fixed effects coefficients of LNFEE(t-1) are biased, they provide useful 
bounds for interpretation purposes. Specifically, relative to dynamic panel estimates, Blundell and Bond 
(2000) and Baum (2013) demonstrate that, due to the correlated error structures, the coefficient of a 
lagged dependent variable is biased downward (upward) for the fixed effects (OLS) panel estimates. As 
commented by Baum (2013, p. 24), ‘given the opposite directions of bias present in these estimates, 
consistent estimates should lie between these values’. As reported below, all our dynamic panel 
coefficient estimates of LNFEE(t-1) lie between those of the fixed effects and OLS models, and are 
therefore consistent on this basis.  
To further illustrate the persistence of real audit fees, Table 3 presents simple univariate reduced 
form panel (autoregressive) regression results where LNFEE is regressed on LNFEE(t-1). For the OLS 
specification, it reveals a very high degree of persistence, with the LNFEE(t-1) coefficient being similar 
(around 0.95) across all models, and with the model R2s also being very high. Unsurprisingly, the table 
shows that when the dynamic system panel system method is employed - where the lagged value of audit 
fees is instrumented with its prior values - the model coefficients reduce substantially, though they still 
exhibit high persistence.  
                                                         Table 4 about here                                                    
Table 4 reports dynamic system panel estimates for the pooled, listed and unlisted samples.  
We present two model specifications. As discussed in the next section, models 1, 3 and 5, which include 
lagged Y and the vector of Xit variables, can be interpreted in terms of a Koyck partial adjustment 
10 
 
process. Models 2, 4 and 6 extend the Koyck specification to include Xit-1 variables and correspond to the 
linear error correction (LEC) model. 
As shown in the table, for all models, the AR(2) serial correlation and over-identification of 
instruments tests are statistically insignificant, implying that the models are well-specified in terms of 
appropriate instruments and the absence of serially correlated model errors.  
Table 4 reveals that, in general, the Xit variables exhibit similar signs and significance levels as 
their counterparts reported in tables 1 and 2. Importantly, the LNFEE(t-1) coefficients are highly 
significant and positive in all models, indicating that real audit fees are temporally persistent, implying 
that current real audit fees partially adjust on the basis of their past realisations. We discuss potential 
explanations for this empirical finding in Section 4. 
  Interestingly, in terms of goodness of fit, difference between model chi-square tests (Werner and 
Schermelleh-Engel, 2010), indicate that LEC specifications (models 2, 4 and 6) have significantly higher 
model chi-squares (at p < 0.001 in all cases) than their Koyck counterparts19 (models 1, 3 and 5). 
However, whereas the coefficient estimates of LNFEE(t-1) for the Koyck and LEC models are similar for 
the pooled (models 1 and 2) and unlisted (models 5 and 6) samples, for the listed sample, the LNFEE(t-1) 
coefficient for the LEC specification (0.419) is larger than that of the Koyck one (0.340). Furthermore, 
statistical tests for the difference between model coefficients (Clogg, Petkova and Haritou, 1995) indicate 
that the coefficients of LNFEE(t-1) for the unlisted Koyck (0.546) and LEC (0.545) specifications are 
significantly larger (at the 5% level in both cases20) than those of their listed model counterparts. 
                                   4.  POTENTIAL EXLANATIONS FOR PERSISTENCE 
In this section we outline potential explanations for our empirical finding that Big 4 real audit fees exhibit 
persistence. However, since our dynamic model estimates are in reduced form we cannot discriminate 
                                                 
19
 As shown in Table 4, this is consistent with a number of Xit-1 variables being statistically significant. In particular, 
the LEC specification for listed companies (Model 4) reveals that both size variables - LNTA(t-1) and LNSAL(t-1) - 
exhibit significant negative coefficients. This result is not counterintuitive. If current real audit fees are positively 
related to size in the long-run, it follows that the coefficient on the lagged size variable in estimates of the LEC 
equation (see Section 4, equation 5) can be negative. 
20
 The p-values for the difference in coefficients values are 0.028 and 0.033 for the Koyck and LEC models 
respectively.  
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between them21. 
(i) Two-period Adjustment Model  
This model provides the simplest explanation for the persistence of real audit fees. It is based on the 
premise that lagged audit fees are used as an initial base to determine current ones, modified with 
reference to the current values of the vector of X variables. There is some qualitative evidence to support 
this interpretation.  The Oxera report prepared for the then Department for Trade and Industry and 
Financial Reporting Council (Oxera, 2006 p.139) states that ‘in the course of the interviews, Oxera has 
learned that the determination of audit fees for any given year (current year) is often closely related to the 
agreed audit fee for the last year, and then amended for any new factors’.  
Consistent with this, a report on audit pricing submitted by Deloitte LLP to the Competition 
Commission (Deloitte, 2012, p.12) notes that ‘the previous year’s audit fee is likely to be the starting 
point for any negotiation over audit fees’. A similar report by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC, 2012, 
p. 16) comments that ‘there are good theoretical reasons to include the previous year’s audit fee in our 
model, not least because last year’s fee is often taken as the starting point for discussing and agreeing the 
following year’s fee’. As reported in models 3 (5) in Table 4, the LNFEE(t-1) coefficients imply that 
0.340 (0.546) of current real audit fees are determined by their prior values for listed (unlisted) 
companies.  
(ii) Partial Adjustment and Error Correction Models 
We next outline two econometric models which can be employed to represent dynamic adjustment 
processes (persistence) in annual real audit fees; that is, where real audit fees are conjectured to adjust 
over a number of periods. 
(a) The Koyck Partial Adjustment Model 
In this model, real audit fees exhibit a desired, planned or target value, Yit*, that depends on the 
                                                 
21
 This would require a structural model based on specifications of the demand and supply for/of real audit fees and 
optimal pricing based on their determinants. For a discussion of demand and supply factors in the context of 
competition in the audit market, see Gerakos and Syverson (2017). 
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explanatory (Xit) variables22. Adjustment to the desired value is given by the Koyck partial adjustment  
mechanism                  
   Yit – Yit–1 = λ(Yit* – Yit–1)        (2) 
where λ is the constant speed of adjustment with restrictions 0 < λ  1. 
Consequently we estimate the reduced form equation        
   Yit = (1 – λ)Yit–1 + λXit +  it      (3) 
Where it is the error term and where t and i denote time and company observations, Y is the log of real 
annual audit fees, and X represents the vector of explanatory variables.  
From inspection of (3) it is clear that higher adjustment speeds towards desired real audit fees are 
associated with smaller estimated coefficients for lagged real audit fees. More specifically, λ = 1 – β.  
Hence, at the limit, a coefficient of 0 for lagged audit fees (λ = 1 – 0 = 1) implies the absence of a 
dynamic (persistent) relationship, with real audit fees adjusting immediately in a single period, being 
unrelated to their lagged values (as assumed by static audit fee models). In contrast a coefficient of 1 (λ = 
1 – 1 = 0) indicates that real audit fees never adjust into steady state, always being comprised of a 
constant mark-up of their lagged values23. Hence, coefficients of 0.9 (0.1) would, for example, be 
associated with slow (fast) adjustments speeds. The LNFEE(t-1) coefficients of 0.340 (0.546) for models 
3(5) reported in Table 4 for listed (unlisted) companies, imply that adjustment is quicker for listed 
auditees (λ = 0.660) than it is for their unlisted counterparts (λ = 0.454). 
(b) The Linear Error Correction Model 
The error correction specification is a form of the autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) model of type 
ARDL (1,1). In the linear error correction (LEC) model, annual real audit fees exhibit a value, Yite, that 
                                                 
22
 This may occur in response to adjustment costs, imperfect market information (see De Villiers et al., 2014, p. 5), 
or strategic pricing. 
23
 Note that the short-run impact of an X variable is λ times its long-run coefficient. For example, if the short-run 
coefficient on X in the Koyck formulation is 0.2 and λ = 0.5, then the long-run coefficient on X is 0.4. We also note 
that estimates of long-run coefficients can exhibit severe bias. For instance, small biases in estimates of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable can have large effects on the estimates of the long-run coefficients. 
This is because the distributions of the estimates of the long-run coefficients are heavy-tailed and complex (see Reed 
and Zhu, 2015). 
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depends solely on the explanatory variables, Xit. Adjustment to this value is given by a linear error 
correction process where changes in the real audit fees adjust in response to deviations from  Yite in the 
past period, together with changes in the Xit variables (see Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991). Letting  
Yite = Xit, the LEC is given by 
Yit – Yit–1 = –(Yit–1 – Xit–1) + (Xit – Xit–1) + uit       (4) 
The estimated reduced form is therefore given by   
Yit = 0Yit–1 + 1Xit + 2Xit–1 + uit        (5) 
Where uit is the error term and i are constant coefficients. 
Comparing (3) and (5) we observe that the Koyck adjustment mechanism is nested within the 
LEC specification24. More specifically, if the Xit variables are statistically significant, but the Xit–1 
variables are not, then we have evidence of a Koyck (rather than a LEC) adjustment process. The long-
run coefficients for the impact of the variables X on Y are given by  
�భ+�మଵ−�బ  or �భ+�మ� .  The short-run 
impact of Xit is given by 1. As with the Koyck partial adjustment model, the speed of adjustment is 
computed as 1–0.  
(iii) Spurious State Dependence 
It is important to note that a further potential source of endogeneity (heterogeneity) is spurious state 
dependence. This may arise in the current study if slow moving variables25 are omitted from the model 
and are correlated with both the dependent and lagged dependent variables. If this source of endogeneity 
is not purged via the GMM instrumentation process, it will result in biased estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable (see Heckman and Borjas, 1980; and Dube, Hitsch and Rossi, 2010). 
In this context, Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis (2016, p.1066) provide a helpful typology of 
                                                 
24
 We should note that there are other processes that can give rise to lagged dependent variable specifications, 
though the interpretation would differ. For example, if one or more of the X variables are expectations of future or 
past values of X - given by (say) an adaptive expectations scheme - we would by substitution obtain a lagged 
dependent variable, but would also induce a serially correlated error term. 
25
 We are grateful to the reviewer for drawing this issue to our attention, especially with regard to slow moving 
variables. 
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sources  of persistence in panel data. With regard to the current study, they can be interpreted as follows: 
(a) true state dependency, which implies that past audit fees are related to current fees; (b) spurious state 
dependence, which implies that latent heterogeneity is at least partly responsible for the persistence of 
audit fees; and (c) the dynamic effects of any shocks impacting on audit fees may lead to serial 
dependence (serial error correlation). In addition, as discussed in Dube et al. (2010), loyalty or 
relationship commitment can lead to price persistence (true state dependence) via an optimal pricing 
policy (for a discussion of  the impact of commitment/loyalty on auditor-client relationships, together 
with their association with audit fees, see Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; De Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999; 
and Farag and Elias, 2011). 
                                                               5.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we extend extant research by modelling Big 4 real audit fees as part of a dynamic adjustment 
process, where audit fees are linked temporally to their lagged values. Using appropriate dynamic panel 
methods, we find strong evidence that Big 4 real audit fees of listed and unlisted UK companies are 
persistent, adjusting temporally on the basis of prior audit fee realisations. We provide a number of 
potential explanations for this persistence, but acknowledge that our reduced form models cannot 
differentiate between them. This would require a structural modelling approach that gives cognisance to 
both supply and demand factors associated with audit fee determinants. 
We conclude that static audit fee models omit a potentially important temporal dimension of audit 
pricing and that further research is warranted across other jurisdictions. Natural extensions to the current 
study include the impact of auditor switching on audit fees, and the pricing of non-Big 4 audits, in a 
dynamic framework. 
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APPENDIX   Variable definitions and summary statistics  
Variables† Description Mean Median 
Audit fees (£) Audit fees, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 85,283 21,950 
Total assets (£000) Total assets, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 443,825 21,440 
Sales (£000) Turnover, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 248,825 20,202 
LNFEE (£) Natural logarithm of audit fees, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 10.074 9.997 
LNTA (£) Natural logarithm of total assets, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 16.979 16.881 
LNSAL (£) Natural logarithm of sales, RPI adjusted, constant December 2012 prices 16.828 16.821 
ARTA Account receivables to total assets 0.164 0.094 
CATA Current assets to total assets 0.638 0.721 
LNSUB Natural Logarithm (1+ number of subsidiaries) 0.214 0.000 
FORSAL Sales outside UK divided by total sales 0.096 0.000 
QUAL 1 if received an audit qualification 0.033 0.000 
LISTED 1 if listed company (base case) 0.030 0.000 
PLC 1 if unquoted public limited company 0.002 0.000 
PRIV 1 if private limited company 0.967 1.000 
TLTA Total liabilities to total assets  0.821 0.743 
PRSAL Profit before tax to sales  -0.037 0.034 
LOSS 1 if company reported a loss 0.284 0.000 
LATE 1 if company filed accounts after statutory deadline  0.110 0.000 
BUSY 1 if company year-end is in December or March 0.722 1.000 
DEL 1 if audited by Deloitte 0.198 0.000 
EY 1 if audited by Ernst and Young 0.195 0.000 
KPMG 1 if audited by KPMG 0.333 0.000 
PwC 1 if audited by PwC (base case) 0.275 0.000 
LOND 1 if company has registered address in London 0.346 0.000 
LNHHI Logarithm of Hirschman-Herfindahl index 7.106 7.271 
INDUSTRY 33 two-digit SIC industry dummy variables - - 
TIME Time dummies for each year  - - 
Notes: 
The number of observations  = 76,867 
† For binary variables, zero is coded for remaining observations.  
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TABLE 1   Fixed effects and OLS panel estimates of audit fees 
  All companies Listed companies Unlisted companies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Variables Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS 
LNTA 0.117*** 0.168*** 0.322*** 0.309*** 0.111*** 0.165*** 
LNSAL 0.190*** 0.333*** 0.285*** 0.277*** 0.188*** 0.333*** 
ARTA 0.0494* 0.0988** 0.242 0.203 0.0474* 0.0970** 
CATA -0.0311 0.122*** 0.0502 0.0487 -0.0357 0.121*** 
LNSUB -0.0200 0.129*** 0.0233 0.0551* -0.0164 0.141*** 
FORSAL 0.0259 0.234*** 0.161*** 0.604*** 0.00458 0.222*** 
QUAL 0.0194 0.0899*** 0.184*** 0.216* 0.0159 0.0840*** 
PLC N/A -1.358*** 
 
  N/A -0.555*** 
PRIV N/A -0.812*** 
 
  
 
  
TLTA 0.0416*** 0.0257*** 0.0625 -0.0371 0.0403*** 0.0255*** 
PRSAL -0.0535*** -0.126*** -0.0862*** -0.152*** -0.0522*** -0.125*** 
LOSS 0.0405*** 0.123*** 0.0260 0.0873 0.0399*** 0.124*** 
LATE 0.0304*** 0.193*** -0.00489 0.00214 0.0307*** 0.205*** 
BUSY 0.0286 0.0428*** 0.0294 0.131* 0.0318 0.0372** 
DEL N/A -0.0199 N/A -0.157* N/A -0.0135 
EY N/A 0.0742*** N/A -0.0501 N/A 0.0803*** 
KPMG N/A -0.107*** N/A -0.178* N/A -0.105*** 
LOND N/A 0.177*** N/A 0.422*** N/A 0.170*** 
LNHHI -0.0474** 0.0205 0.122 0.208** 0.0370 0.115*** 
Constant 5.092*** 2.054*** 0.322*** -0.723 4.570*** 0.631** 
TIME      
INDUSTRY      
R2 0.593 0.660 0.696 0.836 0.565 0.618 
N 76,867 76,867 2,336 2,336 74,531 74,531 
Notes: 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Estimated equation:  
LNFEE = 0 + 1LNTA +2LNSAL +3ARTA + 4CATA + 5LNSUB + 6FORSAL + 7QUAL + 8PLC + 9PRIV + 10TLTA 
+ 11PRSAL + 12LOSS + 13LATE + 14BUSY + 15DEL + 16EY + 17KPMG + 18LOND + 19LNHHI + u 
Time and industry dummy variables are included. 
N/A Indicates that a time invariant coefficient cannot be estimated due to perfect collinearity with fixed effects. 
 ***, **,* indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed tests).  Clustered standard 
errors. 
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TABLE 2   Fixed effects and OLS panel estimates of audit fees including lagged dependent variable 
  All companies Listed companies Unlisted companies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Variables Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS 
LNFEE(t-1) 0.434*** 0.849*** 0.301*** 0.659*** 0.437*** 0.851*** 
LNTA 0.0645*** 0.0197*** 0.284*** 0.140*** 0.0590*** 0.0179*** 
LNSAL 0.138*** 0.0578*** 0.201*** 0.0715** 0.136*** 0.0577*** 
ARTA 0.0527** 0.0492*** 0.270 0.202* 0.0500** 0.0483*** 
CATA -0.0200 0.0128* 0.0463 -0.00280 -0.0238 0.0110 
LNSUB -0.000137 0.00595 0.0278 0.0172 0.00443 0.00331 
FORSAL 0.0422*** 0.0520*** 0.167*** 0.302*** 0.0248* 0.0458*** 
QUAL 0.00447 0.00778 0.158*** 0.0954* 0.00116 0.00695 
PLC N/A -0.208*** 
 
  N/A -0.0561 
PRIV N/A -0.149*** 
 
  
 
  
TLTA 0.0235*** 0.000355 0.0432 -0.00428 0.0222*** -0.000137 
PRSAL -0.0396*** -0.0186*** -0.0686*** -0.0553*** -0.0385*** -0.0175*** 
LOSS 0.0231*** 0.0130*** 0.0158 0.00103 0.0229*** 0.0139*** 
LATE 0.0344*** 0.0563*** 0.000699 0.0189 0.0350*** 0.0582*** 
BUSY 0.0151 0.00426 0.0358 0.0297 0.0169 0.00264 
DEL N/A 0.000857 N/A -0.0332 N/A 0.00155 
EY N/A 0.0187*** N/A -0.0309 N/A 0.0207*** 
KPMG N/A -0.0196*** N/A -0.0613* N/A -0.0180*** 
LOND N/A 0.0338*** N/A 0.131*** N/A 0.0324*** 
LNHHI -0.0218 0.0163 0.112 0.123** 0.0378** 0.0449*** 
Constant 2.413*** 0.233** -1.782 -0.870* 2.049*** -0.105 
TIME      
INDUSTRY      
R2 0.867 0.911 0.788 0.911 0.855 0.901 
N 65,981 65,981 2,095 2,095 63,886 63,886 
Notes: 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Estimated equation:  
LNFEE = 0 + 1LNFEE(t-1) + 2LNTA +3LNSAL +4ARTA + 5CATA + 6LNSUB + 7FORSAL + 8QUAL + 9PLC + 10PRIV + 11TLTA + 12PRSAL + 13LOSS + 14LATE + 15BUSY + 16DEL + 17EY + 18KPMG + 19LOND + 20LNHHI + 
u 
Time and industry dummy variables are included. 
N/A Indicates that a time invariant coefficient cannot be estimated due to perfect collinearity with fixed effects. 
 ***, **,* indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed tests). Clustered standard 
errors. 
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TABLE 3   Reduced form panel estimates of audit fees 
  All companies Listed companies               Unlisted companies             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable  
OLS  
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
OLS  
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
OLS  
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
LNFEE (t-1) 0.950† 0.586† 0.948† 0.519†  0.944†          0.591† 
Model R2 or χ2 0.904 774.5† 0.882 17.58† 0.894 849.8† 
N 65,981 55,095 2,095 1,854 63,886 53,241 
Notes: 
Constants are omitted. 
Estimated equation:  
LNFEE = 0 + 1LNFEE(t-1) + u 
The coefficients of models (2), (4) and (6) are estimated using system GMM estimators.  
†
 indicates coefficients are significant at the 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 4   Dynamic panel model estimates of audit fees 
  All companies Listed companies Unlisted companies 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LNFEE(t-1) 0.541*** 0.540*** 0.340*** 0.419*** 0.546*** 0.545*** 
LNTA 0.0748*** 0.0826*** 0.243*** 0.400*** 0.0716*** 0.0716*** 
LNTA(t-1) 
 
-0.00612 
 
-0.221*** 
 
0.00249 
LNSAL 0.156*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.256*** 0.155*** 0.162*** 
LNSAL(t-1) 
 
-0.0125 
 
-0.0878* 
 
-0.00917 
ARTA 0.0622*** 0.0596*** 0.253 0.320 0.0602*** 0.0586*** 
ARTA(t-1) 
 
0.00168 
 
-0.180 
 
0.00254 
CATA 0.0441*** -0.00251 0.0342 -0.0629 0.0419*** 0.000365 
CATA(t-1) 
 
0.0617*** 
 
0.0805 
 
0.0568*** 
LNSUB 0.0468*** 0.0385 0.0295 0.0378 0.0484*** 0.0539** 
LNSUB(t-1) 
 
0.0111 
 
0.000274 
 
-0.00421 
FORSAL 0.117*** 0.110*** 0.413*** 0.408*** 0.102*** 0.0849*** 
FORSAL(t-1) 
 
0.00619 
 
-0.107 
 
0.0255 
QUAL 0.0285** 0.0163 0.148** 0.128** 0.0243* 0.0107 
QUAL(t-1) 
 
0.0209 
 
0.0923 
 
0.0228 
PLC -0.614*** -0.627*** 
 
  -0.219*** -0.240*** 
PRIV -0.393*** -0.388*** 
 
  
 
  
TLTA 0.0158*** 0.0158** 0.000916 0.153*** 0.0150*** 0.0126* 
TLTA(t-1) 
 
-0.00657 
 
-0.207*** 
 
-0.00403 
PRSAL -0.0542*** -0.0542*** -0.0856*** -0.0808*** -0.0532*** -0.0525*** 
PRSAL(t-1) 
 
-0.00402 
 
-0.0295 
 
-0.00332 
LOSS 0.0352*** 0.0340*** 0.0282 0.0273 0.0354*** 0.0336*** 
LOSS(t-1) 
 
0.0221*** 
 
0.000687 
 
0.0236*** 
LATE 0.0662*** 0.0667*** 0.0140 0.000186 0.0695*** 0.0696*** 
LATE(t-1) 
 
0.0396*** 
 
-0.00866 
 
0.0423*** 
BUSY 0.0163** 0.00984 0.0714 0.0575 0.0134* 0.00861 
BUSY(t-1) 
 
0.00709 
 
0.00272 
 
0.00500 
DEL -0.00635 -0.00573 -0.0985 -0.118** -0.00354 -0.00237 
KPMG -0.0524*** -0.0505*** -0.117* -0.127** -0.0504*** -0.0483*** 
EY 0.0411*** 0.0407*** -0.0434 -0.0429 0.0446*** 0.0441*** 
LOND 0.0901*** 0.0892*** 0.267*** 0.252*** 0.0858*** 0.0847*** 
LNHHI -0.00178 -0.0120 0.180** 0.182** 0.0520*** 0.0364* 
LNHHI(t-1) 
 
0.0567*** 
 
0.0282 
 
0.0531*** 
Constant 1.055*** 0.713*** -1.176* -1.237* 0.305** 0.0338 
TIME      
INDUSTRY      
Over-identification p-value 0.431 0.502 0.962 0.918 0.446 0.488 
AR(2) p-value 0.118 0.123 0.705 0.401 0.135 0.149 
Model χ2 85,018† 91,575† 478.8† 682.7† 68,767† 72,961† 
N 55,095 55,095 1,854 1,854 53,241 53,241 
Notes: 
Variables are defined in the Appendix.  
Estimated equations:  
Models (1), (3) and (5): LNFEE = 0 + 1LNFEE(t-1) + 2LNTA +3LNSAL +4ARTA + 5CATA + 6LNSUB + 7FORSAL + 8QUAL + 9PLC + 10PRIV + 11TLTA + 12PRSAL + 13LOSS + 14LATE + 15BUSY + 16DEL + 17EY + 18KPMG + 19LOND + 20LNHHI + u 
Models (2), (4) and (6): LNFEE = 0 + 1LNFEE(t-1) + 2LNTA + 3LNTA(t-1) +4LNSAL +5LNSAL(t-1) +6ARTA 
+7ARTA(t-1) + 8CATA + 9CATA(t-1) + 10LNSUB + 11LNSUB(t-1) + 12FORSAL + 13FORSAL(t-1) + 14QUAL + 15QUAL(t-1) + 16PLC + 17PRIV + 18TLTA + 19TLTA(t-1) + 20PRSAL + 21PRSAL(t-1) + 22LOSS + 23LOSS(t-1) + 24LATE + 25LATE(t-1) + 26BUSY + 27BUSY(t-1) + 28DEL + 29EY + 30KPMG + 31LOND + 32LNHHI + 33LNHHI(t-
1) + u 
Time and industry dummy variables are included. 
Time invariant variables do not have lagged values due to perfect collinearity. 
The coefficients are estimated using system GMM estimator.  
***,**,* Indicate coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors. 
†
 indicates significant at the 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
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